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I. INTRODUCTION
Extraterritorial jurisdiction and conflict of laws represent two
distinct paradigms for dealing with the same fundamental
phenomenon: how to decide which law governs a
multijurisdictional event or transaction. While the law of
extraterritorial jurisdiction governs the application of federal law,
state conflict of laws rules govern the application of state law. These
are two different methodologies. As to federal law, the Supreme
Court has strongly reinvigorated the so-called “presumption against
extraterritoriality,” which requires a clear indication from Congress
for U.S. law to apply abroad so as to avoid judicial interference in
foreign affairs.1 As to conflict of laws analysis, courts are tasked with
choosing among multiple laws to govern a multijurisdictional
dispute, one of which may be U.S. law.2 This may lead to seemingly
bizarre and perhaps perverse results. State choice of law rules allow
courts wide discretion to choose the applicable law to foreign events
or transactions, and some of these rules permit courts to apply U.S.
law despite minimal U.S. contacts—a methodology that appears far
more flexible and expansive than the federal presumption against
extraterritoriality, and with far more extravagant reach.3 This leads
to the paradox that state law may have broader reach abroad than
federal law;4 yet the federal government, not the states, is supposed

See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 116 (2013).
See generally SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CONFLICT OF
LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 701-77 (4th ed. 2019) (discussing
choice between U.S. federal law and foreign law and U.S. state law and foreign law).
3 See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (N.Y. 1963) (applying New
York law to a tort in Canada).
4 See Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding
the Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia
Bank, 92 B.U. L. REV. 535, 536 (2012) (“Already, it is frequently the case – and as a
result of the Morrison decision will likely be the case more often in future – that state
law applies to such disputes where federal law does not.”). Conversely, there is also
the phenomenon of parochial state presumptions against extraterritorialities,
further muddying the waters. As William Dodge has observed:
[S]tates do not need presumptions against extraterritoriality because every state has
conflicts rules to determine questions of priority when a case falls within the laws
of more than one jurisdiction. State presumptions can also create confusion about
how they fit with other conflicts rules and create inconsistency among state statutes
and with state common law. Finally, . . . state presumptions are not necessary to
avoid conflict with foreign law in international cases.
1
2
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to be in charge of foreign affairs. 5 To put it mildly, the law of
extraterritoriality is a mess.
I intend to clean it up. To begin, I want to take the Supreme
Court’s most recent jurisprudence on the presumption against
extraterritoriality and view it through the lens of conflict of laws to
show how the presumption actually mirrors features of conflicts
doctrine in some respects, giving courts broader discretion than the
presumption may first appear to endow. Indeed, it displays features
of both the traditional Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws and
more modern approaches like Brainerd Currie’s governmental
interest analysis (an approach the Restatement (Third) of Conflict of
Laws looks like it may adopt). My thesis is that when viewed
through the lenses of these conflict methodologies, the Court gets
the law of extraterritoriality wrong. It is wrong because it fails to
take into account the interests of other nations and the international
system. This is a key insight because the presumption grew precisely
out of the perceived need to avoid international friction sparked by
courts unilaterally projecting U.S. law abroad. Yet that’s just what
the presumption now surreptitiously authorizes. In the decade since
it has been reinvigorated, it has shown itself to be a dangerous
anachronism. Conflict of laws has a lot to teach federal
extraterritoriality.
I want to propose that both state and federal extraterritoriality
embrace the same test—one that actually appears in both the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law. At the federal level, it is a test
captured by another canon of statutory construction called the
Charming Betsy canon, and it expressly takes into consideration the
interests of other states and the international system. Finally, it adds
predictability for multistate actors as to what law will apply to their
conduct, making them more comfortable engaging in behavior
deemed beneficent to overall social welfare and upholding the rule
of law.
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,6 Justice Scalia laid out
a two-step framework for gauging the extraterritorial reach of
William S. Dodge, Presumptions Against Extraterritoriality in State Law, 53 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1389, 1389 (2020).
5
See Florey, supra note 4, at 538 (arguing federal law “fosters greater
uniformity and predictability” and that Congress seems better equipped to handle
complaints from other countries).
6
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/2

2022

Extraterritoriality and Conflict of Laws

5

statutes: (1) does the statute clearly indicate extraterritoriality; and
(2) if not, is the “focus” of the statute domestic rather than foreign,
rendering application of U.S. law domestic and thereby avoiding the
presumption altogether. 7 Whether inadvertently or not, Morrison
returned the extraterritorial jurisdiction question back to the First
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which “localized” a
multijurisdictional event or transaction to one element of that event
or transaction, transforming through legal fiction the entire
multijurisdictional event to the place of the localization. 8 Thus
imagine a tort spanning State A and State B. The negligence occurs
in State A, but the ultimate injury occurs in State B. Under the First
Restatement’s localization rule, or lex loci delicti (the law of the place
of the injury), the place of the entire tort would be State B.9 In other
words, the entire multijurisdictional tort is localized to one state and,
fictionally, there is no extraterritorial application of State B law into
State A where the negligence occurred—even though, in reality, of
course State B law would be regulating the negligence that occurred
in State A. This fictional framework was constructed to preserve the
sovereignty of states by selecting one element, localizing, and
stipulating that everything happened in that state’s sovereign
territory. Morrison’s “focus” step makes many of the same moves. It
selects the “focus” of the statute as its localization rule and, if the
“focus” of the statute is the domestic element of the cause of action,
applies U.S. law as the law governing the entire multijurisdictional
event as if it were a purely domestic application of the law.10 But of
course, like with the Restatement, it is not. Imagine securities fraud
is perpetrated in Australia but the resultant sale occurs in the United
States. Morrison would localize the multijurisdictional transaction to
U.S. territory because the “focus” of the Exchange Act—the sale—is
domestic. 11 Like the fiction of the First Restatement, it would
pretend to be a purely domestic application of the law even though
it clearly regulates the foreign fraud. Or to take a real-life example,
in the Supreme Court’s recent case, WesternGeco LLC v. ION
Id. at 255.
See, e.g., Ala. Great S. R.R. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803 (Ala. 1892) (explaining and
describing lex loci delicti).
9
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (AM. L. INST. 1934); see,
e.g., Carroll, 11 So. at 806 (agreeing with the position that the location of the injury
is where a cause of action arises).
10 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.
11 See id. at 266-67.
7

8
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Geophysical Corp., the Court found that supplying materials from the
United States constituted the “focus” of the Patent Act and applied
the Act as a purely domestic application of U.S. law even though the
ultimate injurious conduct and injury occurred abroad. 12
Completely absent from the Court’s analysis was the interest of the
state or states where the harm actually occurred.
At this point an important distinction must be made. The First
Restatement is a set of a priori rules agreed upon by states that
adhered to it; that is, it created a system of conflict of laws. Thus other
states could not complain about the real-life extraterritorial
application of foreign law inside their borders because they had
agreed ex ante to the fictionalization of the Restatement’s localization
rules. Consequently, in our hypothetical above, State A could not
complain that State B’s tort law was extending into State A territory
to regulate conduct there because State A already would have
agreed upon the lex loci delicti localization rule. Obviously, this was
designed to cut down on interstate friction.
The same cannot be said of the Supreme Court’s “focus” test.
Once the Court finds a U.S. “focus” is satisfied, it simply applies U.S.
law irrespective of the views of the other states involved in the
multijurisdictional dispute. Hence, even though it resembles the
Restatement’s localization fiction, Morrison’s test leaves out the part
that respects other states’ sovereignties and has the consequent
potential to create more international friction by employing
unilateral rules to fictionalize the location of multijurisdictional
disputes and apply U.S. law to conduct abroad—without ever
acknowledging it!
Things become even more interesting when Morrison’s test is
compared with the more modern governmental interest analysis of
conflict of laws. And here, an in-depth look at lower court
jurisprudence reveals why. Courts are all over the place as to the foci
of various statutes.13 Yet they all have one thing in common: if the
“focus” is domestic, U.S. law applies irrespective of the interests of
foreign nations. This looks very much like Brainerd Currie’s interest
analysis whereby courts look at the law of the forum, or lex fori, and
discern whether it has an interest in regulating the

WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2137-38 (2018).
See, e.g., Bascuñán v. Elsaca, 927 F.3d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 2019) (“The courts in
this circuit are not of one mind on the focus of [the mail and wire fraud] statutes.”).
12

13
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multijurisdictional dispute. 14 If the forum does have an interest,
forum law applies irrespective of the interests of foreign states—
even if those states have a stronger interest in having their laws
applied.15 The “focus” test similarly looks to the law of the United
States by discerning the “focus” of its laws, and if the “focus” is
domestic, it applies U.S. law irrespective of the interests of foreign
states—even if those states have a stronger interest in having their
laws applied. 16 Currie’s analysis generated severe criticism for
marginalizing other states’ interests and creating interstate friction,17
discarding party rights, 18 and simply calculating state interests
wrongly given the qualitatively different nature of multistate
disputes;19 Morrison’s “focus” analysis does all the same things.
But how do we tell whether the lex fori has an interest? Here
again the similarities are striking. Currie instructed courts to use the
ordinary means of statutory construction. 20 Justice Scalia did the
same thing. Morrison purports to limit the statutory inquiry to a
textual and contextual exegesis; but not even Morrison itself was able
to honestly follow that directive: there is no provision in the statute
Morrison analyzed—the Exchange Act—which says “X is the focus
of the statute.” Thus the opinion fell back on statutory purpose;
namely, preventing fraudulent sales or transactions.21 In attempting
to follow Morrison, lower courts are in disarray in finding the
“focus” of statutes22 and, despite Morrison’s instructions, look to the
purpose of various statutes where the text gives no clear answer.
Crucially, the “focus” test is a thoroughgoing judicial exercise of
14
Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959
DUKE L.J. 171, 177-78 (1959), reprinted in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 183-84 (1963). Subsequent citations are to the book.
15 See id.
16
Anthony J. Colangelo, An International Approach to Maritime Conflict of Laws,
6 ARIZ. L. REV. 1072, 1094 (2020).
17 See Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1301, 1305 (1989) (finding the forum law presumption in Currie’s
analysis unnecessary).
18
Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 2448, 2477 (1999).
19 Id.; Alfred Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws—A Reply to
Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 485 n.108 (1960).
20 See CURRIE, supra note 14, at 183-84.
21
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010) (“Those
purchase-and-sale transactions are the objects of the statute’s solicitude.”).
22 See infra note 136.
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statutory construction. Again, Currie similarly instructed courts to
use ordinary means of statutory construction to reveal the interest
of a statute.
All in all, the “focus” test perverts the First Restatement’s
localization approach to authorize extravagant assertions of
jurisdiction and borrows the worst part of Currie’s interest analysis
to authorize the extension of U.S. law abroad without ever looking
to the interests of other states in the international system.
Moreover, Morrison’s methodology gravely contradicts the
original purpose of the presumption against extraterritoriality. The
presumption grew out of another canon of statutory construction
called the Charming Betsy canon, which holds that courts are to
interpret statutes in line with international law.23 Because at the time
Charming Betsy was born, international law rules of jurisdiction were
strictly territorial,24 a presumption against extraterritoriality made
sense. But now that international law allows for extraterritoriality
and even requires it in some circumstances, 25 the presumption
contradicts its own roots. When one examines the origins of both
canons—avoiding international friction—Charming Betsy clearly
comes out the winner. That is, both canons permit extraterritoriality,
but only one—Charming Betsy—stays true to the fundamental
purpose of avoiding international friction by incorporating the
interests of other states through modern international law.
Thus, just as Morrison’s analysis echoes some of the worst parts
of conflict of laws analysis when it comes to avoiding international
friction, Charming Betsy’s international law analysis echoes some of
the best. In line with Charming Betsy, the Restatement (Third) of
Foreign Relations Law is sensitive to foreign interests courts should
consider in resolving whether to apply U.S. law abroad consistent
with international law. What’s more, it turns out that this provision
of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law was actually
modeled after the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.26 Both
explicitly take into account the needs of the interstate system and the

Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV.
1019, 1058 (2011).
25
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 129 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
26
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(REVISED) § 403 rep. n.10 (AM. L. INST. 1987).
23
24
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interests of other states connected to the dispute.27 Moreover, and of
critical importance, this multilateral test also adds predictability to
the law—a feature crucial to the Rule of Law. The First Restatement
was riddled with randomly applied “escape mechanisms” which
allowed courts to circumvent the law prescribed by the
Restatement’s localization rule. 28 And Currie’s forum favoritism
functionally gives only one party—typically the party bringing
suit—control over where suit is brought and thus which lex fori will
apply. A multilateral test that forthrightly considers the interests of
other states and the parties to the dispute promises to create an
honestly-analyzed body of precedent that, combined with stare
decisis, will allow parties to better predict the law that will apply to
them at the time they act.
In turn, my project proposes disposing of Morrison’s
presumption which continues to baffle lower courts and promotes
the unilateral extension of U.S. law abroad, sparking international
friction. A conflict of laws analysis shows that Morrison has already
outlived itself as a dangerous anachronism. I propose that both
federal extraterritoriality and conflict of laws adopt methodologies
that promote respect for foreign nations and the smooth working of
the international system. Charming Betsy’s international law
analysis, the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, and the Third
and Fourth Restatements of Foreign Relations Law do just that and,
indeed, are actually modeled after one another. 29 This approach
would not only stay true to the goal of avoiding international
friction, but it also would bring into harmony the law of
extraterritoriality governing both state and federal extensions of
U.S. law abroad. Finally, as will be seen, it would promote the rule
of law by enabling parties to multijurisdictional transactions to
better predict what law governs their primary conduct, making
them more comfortable with engaging in activity generally
considered beneficent to overall social welfare like international
commerce, travel, and communication.

27

1971).

Id. § 403; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(a) (AM. L. INST.

SYMEONIDES & PERDUE, supra note 2, at 53.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
(REVISED) § 114 rep. n.1, § 403 rep. n.10 (AM. L. INST. 1987).
28

29
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II. CONFLICT OF LAWS
Before jumping into a comparison between conflict of laws and
extraterritoriality, it will be helpful to trace the development of each
field and extract some common themes.
a. Comity
A, or perhaps the, dominant theme at the genesis of the modern
nation state was territorial sovereignty: each state enjoyed absolute
power over persons and things within its borders and thus no state
could extend its laws into the territory of another.30 This model of
rigidly drawn lines on a map created problems for transnational
commerce and trade that touched multiple states, giving rise to
multiple state interests in applying their laws.31 For in the absence
of some other concept that could reconcile strict territoriality with
overlapping laws, such cases simply meant that no law could fully
apply.
Our story begins in the Netherlands with the Dutch scholar
Ulrich Huber. Huber famously set forth three axioms. The first two
replicated the dominant territoriality of the times, and the third
provided an antidote for multijurisdictional cases:
(1) The laws of each state have force within the state’s
territory but not beyond.
(2) These laws bind all those who are found within the
territory, whether permanently or temporarily.

30
See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 162 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); see
also VAUGHAN LOWE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 138-44 (2007) (“Sovereignty in the
relations between States signifies independence[,] . . . [which] is the right to exercise
therein, to the exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State.”).
31 See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International
Comity as Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 22 (2010)(quoting Huber and his
use of comity as the “mediating principle of law to prevent international discord
and encourage commerce” among territorial sovereignties); see also William S.
Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2085-86, 209596 (2015) (referring to Huber’s three maxims and noting the initial private rationale
for comity for “commercial convenience”).
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(3) Out of comity, foreign laws may be applied so that rights
acquired under them can retain their force, provided they do
not prejudice the state’s powers or rights.32
The genius of the third axiom was that it countenanced the
possibility of foreign law being applied but left it to the state into
whose territory the law was projected whether to apply it. In this
way, Huber was able to reconcile the application of foreign law
inside a state’s territory and preserve that state’s absolute
sovereignty by leaving the application of the foreign law to the
state’s discretion. But while Huber’s extraordinarily influential 33
comity concept resolved the vexing question of how states apply
foreign law, it left open the equally vexing question of when?
Stateside, Huber’s axioms had a profound influence, especially
on Joseph Story, “the intellectual father of American conflicts law.”34
In his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Story essentially borrowed
from Huber, with some elaboration:
[1.] [E]very nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and
jurisdiction within its territory . . . [and its laws] affect, and
bind directly all property, whether real or personal, within
its territory and all persons, who are residents within it, . . .
and also all contracts made, and acts done within it.
[2.] [N]o state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, or
bind property out of its own territory, or bind persons not
resident therein . . . .
[3.] [W]hatever force and obligation the laws of one country
have in another, depend solely upon the laws, and municipal
regulations of the latter, that is to say, upon its own proper
jurisprudence and polity, and upon its own express or tacit
consent. A state may prohibit the operation of all [or of some]
foreign laws, and the rights growing out of them, within its
own territories . . . . When [its law is] silent, then, and then
only, can the question properly arise, what law is to govern
in the absence of a clear declaration of the sovereign will . . . .
[4.] The real difficulty is to ascertain, what principles in point
of public convenience ought to regulate the conduct of
32
33
34

SYMEONIDES & PERDUE, supra note 2, at 13 (emphasis added).
Id. at 13 n.17.
Id. at 16.
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nations on this subject in regard to each other . . . . [T]he
phrase ‘comity of nations’ . . . is the most appropriate phrase
to express the true foundation and extent of the obligation of
the laws of one nation within the territories of another. It is
derived altogether from the voluntary consent of the latter;
and is inadmissible, when it is contrary to its known policy,
or prejudicial to its interests.35
While borrowing largely from Huber, Story put a finer point on
exactly where comity comes from. He could not have been clearer:
“it is not the comity of the courts but the comity of the nation which
is administered and ascertained.” 36 Writing years later, Justice
Cardozo took the same view when confronted with the public policy
exception to the traditional approach to conflict of laws.37 In Loucks
v. Standard Oil Co., the New York decedent had been killed in a road
accident in Massachusetts. 38 The administrators of the decedent’s
estate brought suit in New York and the defendants objected on the
grounds that the Massachusetts tort statute violated New York
public policy and therefore could not be enforced in New York.39
Cardozo toured a hodgepodge of different approaches from
different jurisdictions before substantially curtailing the public
policy exception as erroneously bestowing too much discretion to
courts. Along the way, he made clear that comity was the comity of
the sovereign, not the comity of the courts:

35 Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 19, 21, 24-25, 37 (1834)).
36
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN
REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS § 38 (8th ed.
1883). As William Dodge explains, “[i]n England and America, this [comity]
discretion was exercised in the first instance by courts but subject always to
legislative control. This comity, Story emphasized, was ‘not the comity of courts,
but the comity of the nation.’” Dodge, supra note 31, at 2088.
37
As William Dodge points out, this exception where one state will refuse to
enforce foreign law in its courts because that law violates the forum’s public policy
“is a direct descendant of Huber’s third maxim that a government should enforce
foreign laws ‘so far as they do not cause prejudice to the power or rights of such
government or of its subjects.’” Dodge, supra note 31, at 2101 (quoting Ulrich Huber,
De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis, in PRAELECTIONES JURIS
ROMANI ET HODIERNI § 2 (1689)).
38
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 198 (N.Y. 1918).
39 See id.
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The misleading word “comity” has been responsible for
much of the trouble. It has been fertile in suggesting a
discretion unregulated by general principles. The sovereign
in its discretion may refuse its aid to the foreign right. From
this it has been an easy step to the conclusion that a like
freedom of choice has been confided to the courts. But that,
of course, is a false view. The courts are not free to refuse to
enforce a foreign right at the pleasure of the judges, to suit
the individual notion of expediency or fairness.40
Indeed, “there is nothing in the Massachusetts statute that
outrages the public policy of New York. We have a statute which
gives a civil remedy where death is caused in our own state. We
have thought it so important that we have now embedded it in the
Constitution.”41 Thus, comity resided at the level of the sovereign
and courts were merely its enforcers. 42 The upshot of this power
allocation was that in looking for violations of public policy, it was
not unusual for courts to consult the forum’s laws and
constitutions.43 Thus if Huber tells us how states enforce foreign law,
Story and Cardozo tell us who authorizes the enforcement of foreign
law. What still remains is the question of when. That question
40 Id. at 201-02. A brief but necessary word on the Supreme Court’s definitional
intervention regarding comity. In Hilton v. Guyot, the Court announced:
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1894). As Donald Earl Childress III has
explained, this definition was a sharp break from Story. “Comity became in Hilton
a ‘doctrine of judicial deference’ as well as a ‘doctrine of deference to foreign states,’
as opposed to a doctrine designed to ameliorate sovereign conflict through
attention to the precise sovereign interests at stake in the case at bar.” Childress III,
supra note 31, at 34. Childress further explains that this redefinition “roughly
coincides with a larger move in conflicts jurisprudence away from Story’s comity
theory.” Id. at 35. To be sure, “while comity charted a path of deference in U.S. case
law that has continued unabated, it was discarded as the central premise in
American conflicts theory.” Id. at 44.
41 Loucks, 120 N.E. at 202.
42 See Dodge, supra note 31, at 2088 (“In England and America, this [comity]
discretion was exercised in the first instance by courts but subject always to
legislative control. This comity, Story emphasized, was ‘not the comity of the courts,
but the comity of the nation.’”).
43
Kilberg v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 527 (N.Y. 1961).
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occupied Joseph Beale in his crafting of the First Restatement of
Conflict of Laws, to which we now turn.
b. The First Restatement
As principal draftsman of the First Restatement of Conflict of
Laws and a devoted formalist, Joseph Beale sought to construct an
entire system of choice of law that explained not only how states
enforced other states’ laws, but when. The First Restatement or
“traditional approach” to conflict of laws was built upon three main
pillars: strict territoriality, “localization,” and vested rights. Gone
were the days in which one state allowed the operation of another
state’s laws within the former’s territory as the traditional approach
replaced comity as the leading approach to choice of law in the
United States at the beginning of the last century. 44 The First
Restatement held territorial sovereignty as absolute, not subject to
exception. According to Beale, “[comity’s] error . . . lies in the
supposition that the courts are accepting the doctrines of Conflict of
Laws by comity rather than the legislative power of the state.” 45
There was simply no choice among sovereigns because there could
be no such thing as the exercise of one sovereign’s laws inside the
territory of another. But Beale needed some mechanism to explain
the obvious existence of the field of conflict of laws. Here he hit upon
the fiction of localization and the notion of vested rights.
To begin, Beale devised a series of “localization” rules that
essentially took one element of a multijurisdictional transaction and
“localized” the entire transaction to where that element occurred.
Thus in torts, the localization rule in a multijurisdictional tort was
where the injury occurred, or the lex loci delicti.46 Or in contracts, it

44 See Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the Metaphysics
of the Stand-Alone Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1129 n.10 (2010).
45 See JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6.1 (1935); see
also Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. COMP.
L. 297, 307 (1953)(noting that the “comity of nations” concept was sanctioned by
American and English courts in the early eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
46 See Ex parte U.S. Bank Ass’n, 148 So.3d 1060, 1069 (Ala. 2014) (“Under [the
lex loci delicti] principle, an Alabama court will determine the substantive rights of
an injured party according to the law of the state where the injury occurred.”).
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was where the contract was made, or the lex loci contracus.47 This was
the only law that could apply. Thus, take a tort suit where the
negligence occurred in State A, but the injury occurred in State B.
The Restatement’s localization rule for torts would say the entire tort
occurred in State B—where the injury was felt—and thus only State
B law could apply. These were precisely the facts of the famous case
Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Carroll.48 A brakeman working
for the Alabama Great Southern Railroad was injured in
Mississippi—which had a fellow servant rule—due to negligence in
Alabama, which did not.49 The brakeman was from Alabama, as was
the defendant railroad.50 Moreover, the contract of employment was
entered into in Alabama.51 And again, the negligence producing the
injury occurred in Alabama.52 But because the injury occurred across
the line in Mississippi, Mississippi law governed.53
But the brakeman brought suit in Alabama. 54 Under Beale’s
theory as we have articulated it so far, only Alabama law could
apply in Alabama courts, leaving the court with only two options:
apply the law of the forum (contrary to the lex loci delicti) or dismiss
the case. Beale’s solution to this choice of law dilemma was the
concept of vested rights. Here, simply reverse the laws in Carroll
such that the plaintiff had a right of action under Mississippi law but
not under Alabama law. The First Restatement would say that the
right “vested” under Mississippi law, and Alabama courts simply
enforced that right. And here’s the key: in doing so, the Alabama
courts were emphatically not applying Mississippi law. Rather, they
were enforcing or recognizing a fact—the right—in their courts.
Beale put it this way in his treatise, published one year after the
Restatement:
The law annexes to the event a certain consequence, namely,
the creation of a legal right . . . . When a right has been
47
Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163, 164 (Conn. 1928) (“A
liability arising out of a contract depends upon the law of the place of
contract . . . .”).
48
Ala. Great S. R.R. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 803 (Ala. 1892).
49 Id. at 805.
50 Id. at 803.
51 Id. at 804.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 804, 809.
54 See id. at 803.
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created by law, this right itself becomes a fact . . . . [T]he
existing right should everywhere be recognized; since to do
so is merely to recognize the existence of a fact.55
Or in Cardozo’s characteristically elegant prose:
“A foreign statute is not law in this state, but it gives rise to
an obligation, which, if transitory, ‘follows the person and
may be enforced wherever the person may be found.’”56 This
move kept strict territoriality perfectly intact: “No law can
exist as such except the law of the land; but . . . it is a
principle of every civilized law that vested rights shall be
protected. The plaintiff owns something, and we help him to
get it.”57
The supposed advantages of this approach can be grouped into
three main concepts: uniformity, predictability, and neutrality.
Because the right could vest under the laws of only one state, that
right had to be enforced the same way everywhere. Forum shopping
was theoretically eliminated. Next, because only one law could
create the right, and the right was territorially defined, legal actors
could predict what law (or to be more accurate, what vested right)
would apply to them no matter where they brought suit. Finally,
unlike with fuzzy notions of comity, courts had little 58 to no
discretion but to enforce the right—recall Cardozo: “it is a principle
of every civilized law that vested rights shall be protected.” 59 In
short, Beale set out to create an entire system that preserved the
seemingly irreconcilable goals of strict territoriality and the field of
conflict of laws.
But in so doing, he had to manufacture some serious legal
fictions, centering mainly on his localization rules. Recall that the
law of the place of the injury in a tort suit, or lex loci delicti,
determined the applicable law. Now let’s return to our hypothetical
in which the negligence occurred in State A but the injury occurred
in State B. Beale would say that State B law governed the entire
Brilmayer & Anglin, supra note 44, at 1130.
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918).
57 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
58
This little discretion would be the so-called “public policy exception”
discussed earlier, where the foreign law violates some fundamental policy of the
forum.
59 Loucks, 120 N.E. at 201.
55
56
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multijurisdictional dispute to create the cause of action, thereby
preserving territorial sovereignty. But of course, that was not true.
The negligence—a necessary element of the tort—occurred in State
A. So what we have, in reality, is State B law reaching into State A to
govern conduct inside State A territory. This extraterritorial
jurisdiction was anathema to the entire system Beale had
constructed.
Keep this in mind when we get to Morrison, for it basically does
the same thing by surreptitiously authorizing extraterritorial
jurisdiction through localization fictions, contrary to the very
doctrine it set out to strengthen: the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Keep in mind also that Beale set out to create a
system, predicated on the consent of states to his localization fictions.
Thus, because State A had agreed ex ante to the lex loci delicti, it could
not complain about State B law invading its territorial sovereignty.
Morrison will do away with this consent component, promising
friction and retaliation from other states.
c. Currie’s Interest Analysis
Despite Beale’s best efforts, the traditional approach began to
crack under the weight of a series of so-called “escape devices.”
These were tools courts could use to evade the localization rule’s
predetermined law to achieve the result the court wanted. We have
seen the public policy exception already. 60 There were also
characterization devices, whereby the court could take one kind of
lawsuit and recast it as another type of lawsuit to get a different
localization rule. For example, the court might take what looked like
a tort suit arising out of a car accident in State A—leading to the lex
loci delicti—and recharacterize it as a contract suit relating to the
rental of the automobile involved in State B—leading to the lex loci
contractus. 61 Or the court might recast a tort case involving
interspousal immunity to a family law issue governed by the law of
the parties’ domicile.62 Similarly, a court could recharacterize a rule
as substantive or procedural to achieve the desired result, usually
evading foreign law, for procedural rules are always governed by
60
61
62

See id. at 198.
See Levy v. Daniels U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 143 A. 163, 164 (Conn. 1928).
See Haumschild v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814, 818 (Wis. 1959).
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forum law. 63 Or the court could characterize the law as penal in
order to apply its own law (a state will only apply its own penal
laws).64 What’s more, parties had no idea ahead of time if and what
“escape device” a court might deploy, rendering the law arbitrary
and undermining all three touted goals of the traditional approach.
These and other problems—like the absurd results even
faithfully applied localization rules produced—led to the so-called
“choice of law revolution,” which instead centered around state
interests. 65 Interestingly, viewed through a certain lens, interest
approaches were more predictable than the traditional approach
because parties could look to precedent to see whether and how
courts found and measured state interests, and accordingly which
law came out on top on a similar set of facts.
The principal revolutionary was Brainerd Currie, who
heretically announced: “We would be better off without choice-oflaw rules.” 66 In good realist fashion, he explained that “the
traditional system of conflict of laws counsels the courts to sacrifice
the interests of their own states mechanically and heedlessly,
without consideration of the policies and interests involved; and
there is need to dispel the paralyzing influence of that system.” 67
Indeed, “[t]he rules so evolved have not worked and cannot be made
to work.”68 Currie proposed instead an approach that looked to state
interests to determine which law would apply. He divided up cases
into three main categories: false conflicts, true conflicts, and
unprovided-for cases.69 False conflicts were cases in which only one
state had an interest in applying its law; true conflicts were cases in
which more than one state had an interest in applying its law; and
unprovided for cases were cases where no state had an interest in
applying its law.70

See Kilberg v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 529 (N.Y. 1961).
See, e.g., Loucks, 120 N.E. at 201-02 (analyzing applicability of other state’s
law that imposes punitive damages).
65 See generally SYMEONIDES & PERDUE, supra note 2, at 143-48 (introducing
early, prominent scholars critiquing the traditional approach of localization).
66
CURRIE, supra note 14, at 183.
67
BRAINERD CURRIE, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental
Interests and the Judicial Function, in ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, 278 (1963).
68
CURRIE, supra note 14, at 180.
69 See SYMEONIDES & PERDUE, supra note 2, at 158-59.
70 Id.
63
64
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As the quoted language above about courts “sacrific[ing] the
interests of their own states” suggests, undergirding this entire
approach was a strong preference for the law of the forum, or the lex
fori. 71 And animating this preference for the lex fori was the
separation of powers tenet that it simply was not the role of the court
to choose foreign law if the forum had any interest in applying its
own law—even if the forum’s interest was smaller than the foreign
interest.72 In Currie’s words, “assessment of the respective values of
the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order
to determine which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high
order. This is a function that should not be committed to courts in a
democracy.”73 The root problem of the traditional approach was that
it inadvertently “nullif[ied] state interests,”74 and in particular the
interests of the sovereign forum of which the court was an extension;
for “when the court, in a true conflict situation, holds the foreign law
applicable, it is assuming a great deal: it is holding the policy, or
interest, of its own state inferior and preferring the policy or interest
for the foreign state.”75 This courts could not do. A court refusing to
apply its home state’s law where its home state has an interest in
having its law apply is a blatant disregard of the separation of
powers.
But how do we tell whether the forum has an interest? Currie’s
reply: “This process is essentially the familiar one of construction or
71 See Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 129-30 (1882) (discussing the function
of lex fori in effecting a foreign law).
72 See Foster v. Legget, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972) (explaining that
“if there are significant contacts—not necessarily the most significant contacts—
with Kentucky, the Kentucky law should be applied”); Kennedy v. Ziesmann 522
F. Supp 730, 731 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (“When the court has jurisdiction of the parties its
primary responsibility is to follow its own substantive law.”) (quoting Foster, 484
S.W.2d at 829 n.69); Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 113 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968)
(“[T]he conflicts question should not be determined on the basis of weighing of
interests, but simply on the basis of whether Kentucky has enough contacts to justify
applying Kentucky law.”) (emphasis in original); Mem’l Hall Museum v.
Cunningham, 455 F. Supp. 3d 347, 358 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (“Kentucky courts hold that
any significant contact with Kentucky is sufficient to allow an application of
Kentucky law.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Marsh v. Burrell, 805
F. Supp. 1493, 1497 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“[E]ven in cases involving foreign elements,
the court should be expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of decision
found in the law of the forum . . . .”) (quoting CURRIE, supra note 14, at 183).
73
CURRIE, supra note 14, at 182.
74 Id. at 180.
75 Id. at 182.
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interpretation.”76 That is, “the method I advocate is the method of
statutory construction, and of interpretation of common-law rules,
to determine their applicability.”77
Take the case of Lilienthal v. Kaufman, which involved an Oregon
spendthrift statute. 78 The defendant was an Oregonian who had
been declared a spendthrift under Oregon law. 79 He executed a
contract in California (where the plaintiff was from) for money to
engage in a joint venture to sell binoculars; “[t]he money was loaned
to defendant in San Francisco, and by the terms of the note, it was to
be repaid to plaintiff in San Francisco.” 80 The Oregon court first
determined that under California law, the plaintiff would recover
and that both states had an interest in applying their laws,81 placing
the case into the true conflicts category. It then did what Currie
advised: defer to the legislature, which was concerned with the
spendthrift’s family and Oregon’s public funds. 82 In the court’s
words:
Courts are instruments of state policy. The Oregon
Legislature has adopted a policy to avoid possible hardship
to an Oregon family of a spendthrift and to avoid possible
expenditure of Oregon public funds which might occur if the
spendthrift is required to pay his obligations. In litigation
Oregon courts are the appropriate instrument to enforce this
policy.83
Interestingly, some courts used Currie’s directives to find no
interest of the forum state, even though superficially there appeared
to be one. In People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, a buyer purchased an
automobile in Texas from a Texas dealer.84 He executed a note for
the unpaid balance of the purchase price, giving the dealer a
mortgage on the automobile to secure payment.85 The dealer in turn
Id. at 183-84.
BRAINERD CURRIE, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 584, 627 (1963).
78
Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 544 (Or. 1964).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 545-46.
81 Id. at 545-47.
82 Id. at 549.
83 Id.
84
People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 311 P.2d 480, 480 (Cal. 1957).
85 Id.
76

77
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assigned the note and mortgage to a Texas corporation that financed
the sales of automobiles.86 The buyer then drove the automobile to
California, where he used it to transport marijuana.87 California had
a statute providing that an automobile used to transport narcotics
was forfeited to the state, subject to the exception of an innocent
mortgagee who conducts “a reasonable investigation of the moral
responsibility, character, and reputation of the purchaser.”88 Texas
had no such law and the mortgagee had conducted no such
investigation. 89 In deciding which law to apply—Texas or
California—Justice Traynor did what Currie proposed: he used
ordinary methods of statutory construction. In his words:
Not only is section 11620 not made expressly applicable to
an innocent mortgagee financing the sale of an automobile
in another state for exclusive use there, but the statutory
enumeration of relationships between the mortgagor and the
state of California in the 1955 amendment to that section
(Stats.1955, ch. 1209, § 5), plainly indicates that in requiring
a “reasonable investigation” to avoid forfeiture, the
Legislature was preoccupied with California mortgagors
and mortgagees.90
Thus, not only the plain language of the statute, but also the
statutory context, helped him draw the spatial reach of the
California statute.
The principal takeaways for our purposes are that Currie viewed
conflict of laws disputes as essentially separation of powers
questions: it simply was not the role of the court to apply a foreign
law if the forum had any interest in the application of its own law.
The foreign law was completely sidelined. Moreover, in discerning
whether the forum had an interest, courts were to use ordinary
methods of statutory construction and common law interpretation.
Currie was not without his critics. His forum favoritism was
attacked on a number of grounds. First of all, the uncompromising
pursuit of forum interests at the expense of foreign states with larger
interests in the dispute promised anarchy. In the words of one
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 480-81.
Id. at 481.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 482.

Published by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

22

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

Vol. 44:1

commentator, “Currie’s analysis, which compels him to give to the
forum’s law such broad effects, would tend to fasten upon the
international and the interstate communities . . . a legal order
characterized by chaos and retaliation.”91 This raises the attendant
problem of individual rights, which had no place in Currie’s
methodology. As he unapologetically stated, “I can find no place in
the conflict-of-laws analysis for a calculus of private interests. By the
time the interstate plane is reached the resolution of conflicting
private interests has been achieved; it is subsumed in the statement
of the laws of the respective states.”92
What is so glaringly absent here are party expectations about
what law would apply to their multistate dispute. If we suppose that
there are two types of predictability in the law—primary and
secondary—Currie ruthlessly sacrifices the former for the latter,
creating serious rule of law problems. For in order for law to
function, it must be predictable in the sense that it tells legal actors
how to behave out in the real world. This is what we might refer to
as primary predictability, and the more primary predictability the
law has the more legal actors feel free to engage in activity deemed
beneficent to overall social welfare like travel, communication, and
trade. Secondary predictability, on the other hand, relates only to the
predictability of what law will apply once the legal actor is before a
certain court. Crucially, under a Currie approach that applies forum
law based on only the slightest of interests, at least one actor (usually
the defendant) may have had little to no notice of the substantive
law being applied to him at the time he acted, over time chilling
primary behavior good for society overall. The far more predictable
law for guiding primary behavior would be that of the state with the
most contacts, and the most interest, in the dispute.
Last, some scholars have charged that Currie simply calculated
state interests wrong. This criticism centers on a qualitative
difference between purely intrastate cases and multistate cases, and
observes that “Currie refused to consider a state’s ‘multistate’
interests—namely, interests that, though not reflected directly in a

91
Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Book Reviews, 17 J. LEG. ED. 91, 96-97 (1964)
(reviewing CURRIE, supra note 14).
92
CURRIE, supra note 77, at 610.
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state’s domestic law, stem from the state’s membership in a broader
community of states.”93
To illustrate some of these critiques, and especially the last two,
let us return to Lilienthal v. Kaufman. Recall that the California
plaintiff entered into a contract in California, the money was loaned
to the defendant in San Francisco, and by the terms of the note, it
was to be repaid to the plaintiff in San Francisco. 94 Given these
contacts, the plaintiff could most reasonably expect California law
to govern the transaction. But the Oregon court stretched Oregon’s
spendthrift statute into California to pull the rug right out from
under the California creditor, defeating his reasonable expectations
and perhaps chilling his future willingness to engage in commerce
with out-of-staters (almost certainly Oregonians). What’s more, the
court gave an incomplete account of Oregon’s interests due to the
qualitatively different nature of the multistate dispute. Although it
did mention some of this in passing, 95 the multistate dimension
actually favored California law because Oregon had an interest in
commercial actors from other states doing business with
Oregonians. Put another way, Oregon had an interest in the
application of California law—an interest that would have been
absent in a purely intrastate dispute.
As we will see now, the Supreme Court’s most recent
jurisprudence on the extraterritorial application of federal law
resurrects many of the problems conflict of laws analyses generated,
and in some ways the problems are even worse.
III. EXTRATERRITORIALITY
a. Origins
A presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S.
law was born early in the nation’s history. As with Huber’s and
Story’s starting points, the root was strict territorial sovereignty. To

93
Symeon C. Symeonides, The Choice-of-Law Revolution Fifty Years After Currie:
An End and a Beginning, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1847, 1852 (2015).
94 See Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 544-49 (Or. 1964).
95 See id.at 547-49.
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borrow Chief Justice Marshall’s elegant restatement from The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it,
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a
diminution of its sovereignty . . . .
....
. . . [Consequently] [t]his full and absolute territorial
jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign . . .
[is] incapable of conferring extra-territorial power . . . . 96
United States v. Palmer 97 is often regarded as the first case to
employ the presumption. 98 At issue was whether section 8 of the
first federal criminal statute, enacted in 1790 and outlawing piracy
by “any person or persons,” reached high-seas robbery committed
by foreigners, against foreigners, on a foreign-flag ship.99 Looking
for clues, Marshall first hit upon the title of the Act, “an act for the
punishment of certain crimes against the United States,” to glean
that Congress’s concern was with “offences against the United
States, not offences against the human race.” 100 From here, he
reasoned that the catholicity of the terms “any person or persons”
did not “comprehend every human being.”101 Instead, the “words
must be limited in some degree, and the intent of the legislature will
determine the extent of this limitation.”102 This immediately raises
the question of whether the legislature could extend the law into the
territory of a foreign state—for at the time, a ship flying a nation’s
96
Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–37, superseded by
statute, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891,
as recognized in Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 140 S. Ct. 1601, 1605-06 (2020).
97
United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
98 See Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 511 (1997); see also William S. Dodge, Understanding
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85 n.2 (1998). But
see John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351,
364
(2010)
(distinguishing
“extrajurisdictionality”
in
Palmer
from
extraterritoriality).
99 Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 631.
100 Id.
101 See id. at 631-32.
102 Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/2

2022

Extraterritoriality and Conflict of Laws

25

flag was essentially considered a floating piece of that nation’s
territory 103 —implying that the legislature did indeed have this
power.
But did it use it? Here Marshall made a series of mistakes to
conclude that the legislature had not extended U.S. law to the piracy
at issue in the case, namely, robbery on the high seas. He noted the
statute’s other catholic terms: “any captain, or mariner of any ship
or other vessel” and “any seaman.” 104 And he hypothesized that
although the statute prohibited acts of violence against a ship’s
commander by “any seaman,” “it cannot be supposed that the
legislature intended to punish a seaman on board a ship sailing
under a foreign flag, under the jurisdiction of a foreign government,
who should lay violent hands upon his commander, or make a
revolt in the ship.”105 For:
[t]hese are offences against the nation under whose flag the
vessel sails, and within whose particular jurisdiction all on
board the vessel are. Every nation provides for such offences
the punishment its own policy may dictate; and no general
words of a statute ought to be construed to embrace them
when committed by foreigners against a foreign
government.106
Marshall’s mistake was that he conflated two types of piracy:
piracy by statute and piracy under the law of nations. All of his
hypothetical crimes were examples of piracy by statute, which was
a creature of municipal law.107 Robbery on the high seas, on the other
hand, was a crime against the law of nations that any state could
punish should it lay hands on the perpetrator.108 This mistake was
corrected a year later in an 1819 statute that punished, accordingly,
“any person or persons whatsoever” who “shall, on the high seas,
103 See id. at 632 (“These are offences against the nation under whose flag the
vessel sails . . . .”).
104 Id.
105 Id.; see also Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572, 574 (1880) (“A vessel at sea is
considered as a part of the territory to which it belongs when at home. It carries
with it the local legal rights and legal jurisdiction of such locality.”); St. Clair v.
United States, 154 U.S. 134, 152 (1894); United States v. Smiley, 27 F. Cas. 1132, 1134
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1864).
106 Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 632–33.
107 See generally Colangelo, supra note 24, at 1047-54 (noting the distinction
between unilateral and multilateral sources of legislative authority).
108 See id.
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commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations.”109 By this
language, Congress clearly intended to extend U.S. law to robbery
on the high seas or piracy against the law of nations.110 Hence, the
presumption was overcome. In sum, the Court transformed Huber’s
first two axioms and Story’s first three into a legislative presumption
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. This superable
presumption is in keeping with the relationship between U.S. and
international law; Congress can override international law—here
the law of territorial sovereignty—if it wants to.111
One interesting aspect of Palmer and the 1819 statute that
corrected it is whether the statute actually authorized the
extraterritorial extension of U.S. law at all. Recall that the statute
applied to piracy the phrase “as defined by the law of nations.”112
The law of nations, or international law, is not territorially
circumscribed; it applies everywhere. Moreover, piracy was, and
still is, a crime of “universal jurisdiction” that any state can
prosecute no matter where it occurs or whom it involves.113 Thus
instead of viewing the 1819 statute as authorizing the projection of
U.S. law into the territory of another state, it may be seen as the
domestic enforcement mechanism for an international law that
covers the globe.

109
Act of Mar. 3, 1819, Pub. L. No. 15-77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (1819) (An Act
to Protect the Commerce of the United States, and Punish the Crime of Piracy)
(emphasis added).
110 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161, 163 n.8 (1820).
111 See United States v. Pinto-Mejia, 720 F.2d 248, 259 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[I]n
enacting statutes, Congress is not bound by international law. If it chooses to do so,
it may legislate with respect to conduct outside the United States, in excess of the
limits posed by international law.”).
112
Act of Mar. 3, 1819 § 5, 3 Stat. at 513-14.
113 See Convention on the High Seas, art. 19, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2314,
2319-2320, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 96-98.
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b. The Modern Presumption
i. The “Focus” Localization Rule
The history of the presumption against extraterritoriality in U.S.
law has been exhaustively and ably described elsewhere.114 Suffice
it to say that the Supreme Court completely revamped it in Morrison
v. National Australia Bank,115 and accordingly we will use that as our
starting point. Morrison was an example of what is often referred to
as a “foreign cubed case”—foreign plaintiff, foreign defendant,
foreign harm. In Morrison, all three were Australian.116 Despite all
these foreign elements, some of the fraud leading to the foreign
harm, i.e., the sale of the securities, occurred in Florida.117 Writing
for the Court, Justice Scalia set out a two-step framework, now wellknown to those laboring in the field of extraterritoriality: (1) was the
presumption against extraterritoriality overcome; 118 and (2) if not,
was the “focus” of the statute the domestic element of the multistate
dispute before the Court.119

114
William S. Dodge, The New Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 133 HARV.
L. REV. 1582, 1589-603 (2020).
115
Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
116 See id. at 251-52.
117 See id.
118 See id. at 255.
119 See id. at 266.
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Step one has produced a tremendous outpouring of scholarly
commentary120 and judicial analysis,121 but it is not the part of the
framework I principally focus on (no pun intended). Boiled down,
in order to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, the
statute must contain a “clear indication” or “affirmative indication”
of extraterritorial application.122 This is not a “clear statement” rule,
for “[a]ssuredly context can be consulted as well.”123 But neither will
boilerplate language like “foreign commerce” satisfy the test. 124
What’s important for our purposes is the reason for the presumption:
“The probability of incompatibility with the applicable laws of other
120 See Dodge, supra note 114; Colangelo, supra note 24; Natascha Born, The
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality: Reconciling Canons of Statutory Interpretation
with Textualism, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 541 (2020); Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe, Comment,
Innocent Abroad? Morrison, Vilar, and the Extraterritorial Application of the Exchange
Act, 123 YALE L.J. 1875 (2014); Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison
v. National Australia Bank, Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against
Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 40 SW. L. REV. 655 (2011); John H. Knox,
The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 40 SW. L. REV. 635 (2011); S.
Nathan Williams, Note, The Sometimes “Craven Watchdog”: The Disparate CriminalCivil Application of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 63 DUKE L.J. 1381 (2014);
Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the
Extraterritorial Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
92 B.U. L. REV. 535 (2012); R. Davis Mello, Note, Life After Morrison:
Extraterritoriality and RICO, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1385 (2011); Marc I. Steinberg
& Kelly Flanagan, Transnational Dealings—Morrison Continues to Make Waves, 46
INT’L L. 829 (2012).
121 See, e.g., Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 270-72 (2d Cir. 2014)
(applying Morrison’s two-step framework strictly); see also Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens
AG, 763 F.3d 175, 178-183 (2d Cir. 2014); Prime Int’l Trading, LTD. v. BP P.L.C., 937
F.3d 94, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2019); Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc., 631
F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2010); SEC v. Scoville, 913 F.3d 1204, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2019)
(finding that Congress gave affirmative indication of extraterritorial reach in the
securities acts); In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 210 (2d Cir. 2016), vacated, United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d
11, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (discussing the Alien Tort Statute), vacated in part, 527 F.
App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Harris, 991 F.3d 552, 559 (4th Cir. 2021)
(acknowledging that the coercion and enticement statute likely passes the first step
but deciding the situation calls for a domestic application); Int’l Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Amerijet Int’l., Inc., 604 F. App’x 841, 852-53 (finding that the statute
does not apply extraterritorially but the particular situation would not be an
extraterritorial application); United States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 391-93 (5th Cir.
2016) (analyzing the statute criminalizing possession, manufacture, or distribution
of controlled substance); Keller Found. v. Tracy, 696 F.3d 835, 845-46 (9th Cir. 2012).
122 See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 263.
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countries is so obvious that if Congress intended such foreign
application it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with
foreign laws and procedures.”125 The Court would three years later
elaborate that the “presumption serves to protect against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations
which could result in international discord.”126 It explained:
For us to run interference in . . . a delicate field of
international relations there must be present the affirmative
intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the
facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy
decision where the possibilities of international discord are
so evident and retaliative action so certain.127
When it comes to the reach of U.S. law abroad, “[t]he
presumption against extraterritorial application helps ensure that
the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S.
law that carries foreign policy consequences not clearly intended by
the political branches.”128 In short, the presumption is a separation
of powers canon: the United States can cause friction with foreign
nations through the extraterritorial application of its laws, it is just
that the actor causing those frictions must be Congress, not the
courts. This makes perfect sense not only to avoid international
friction sparked by a non-political actor, but to avoid the potential
mess of different courts applying the same law differently, leading
to a cacophony of voices in U.S. foreign relations when there should
be only one.129
After finding that the presumption had not been overcome in
Morrison, the Court turned to the petitioners’ second argument,
namely, the case simply did not involve the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law at all. Because some of the fraudulent
conduct occurred in Florida, Morrison merely presented the
domestic application of U.S. law.130 The Court’s response: “[I]t is a
Id. at 269 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 155 (2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
127 Id. at 115-16.
128 Id. at 116.
129 See generally David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953 (2014)
(discussing the failings of the one voice doctrine which states that the United States
must be able to speak in one voice in its external relations).
130 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.
125

126
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rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks all
contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog
indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domestic activity
is involved in the case.”131
The key, according to the Court, was discerning the “focus” of
the statute. 132 Performing a textual exegesis of the Exchange Act,
Scalia concluded that the “focus” of the Act was “not upon the place
where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of
securities in the United States.”133 In his words, “[t]hose purchaseand-sale transactions are the objects of the statute’s solicitude.” 134
What’s so remarkable about this move from a separation of powers
standpoint is that discerning the statute’s “focus” is a
thoroughgoing judicial exercise; nowhere in the Exchange Act does
it say “purchase and sale transactions are the focus of this Act.”
Thus, while bowing to legislative supremacy and embracing judicial
modesty in the first part of the opinion, Scalia arrogates to courts the
power to determine a law’s “focus” in the second. Of course, none
of this would matter if we were dealing with purely domestic cases.
But the “focus” inquiry was designed specifically for cases with
multijurisdictional elements. And those elements completely vanish
when a statute applies to a domestic “focus.”135 Indeed, courts freely
admit this. 136 Make no mistake, the “focus” test is a species of
localization rule.
To illustrate what I mean, flip the facts of Morrison. In Morrison,
there was fraudulent conduct in Florida that led to fraudulent sales
Id.
Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 267.
135 See United States v. Hussain, 972 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Federal
criminal law generally applies to domestic conduct, so when foreign conduct is also
involved, questions arise as to whether a U.S. prosecution exceeds its proper
bounds. Under the longstanding ‘presumption against extraterritoriality,’ the
Supreme Court has held that ‘[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the
contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic application.’ . . . But
if the object of a federal law is conduct that occurs in this country, the concerns
associated with a potentially extraterritorial application of our laws do not come
into play.” (quoting RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016))..
136 See WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2138
(2018); Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 F.3d 266, 275 (2d Cir. 2014); United States
v. Wolfenbarger, No. 16-CR-00519-LHK-1, 2020 WL 2614958, at *11-12 (N.D. Cal.
May 22, 2020).
131
132
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in Australia. 137 The Supreme Court found that the “focus” of the
Exchange Act was the sales, and since they were foreign, U.S. law
did not apply. 138 Now imagine that the fraudulent conduct took
place in Australia, leading to fraudulent sales in the United States.
The “focus” would be on the sales, leading to the ‘domestic’
application of U.S. law. In reality, however, the application of U.S.
law would also encompass the fraudulent conduct in Australia, and
that would be an extraterritorial application of U.S. law. And this
extraterritoriality would completely ignore, to use the Supreme
Court’s language—backed up by numerous amicus briefs from
foreign countries—those countries’ laws, for:
Like the United States, foreign countries regulate their
domestic securities exchanges and securities transactions
occurring within their territorial jurisdiction. And the
regulation of other countries often differs from ours as to
what constitutes fraud, what disclosures must be made,
what damages are recoverable, what discovery is available
in litigation, what individual actions may be joined in a
single suit, what attorney’s fees are recoverable, and many
other matters.139
Indeed, the amicus briefs in the case “all complain of the
interference with foreign securities regulation that application of §
10(b) abroad would produce.”140
Or take a fairly recent case from the Court itself illustrating these
principals. WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corporation involved
the respondent shipping components overseas and combining those
components abroad to create a system indistinguishable from that
of petitioners. 141 The question presented was whether petitioners
could recover damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284 of the Patent Act for a
violation of § 271(f)(2). 142 Section 284 states that “the court shall
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement.”143 The Court “conclude[d] that ‘the infringement’ is
137
138
139
140
141
142
143

Morrison, 564 U.S. at 273.
Id. at 266-67.
Id. at 269.
Id.
WesternGeco LLC, 138 S. Ct. at 2135.
Id. at 2134-35.
Id. at 2137.

Published by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

32

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

Vol. 44:1

the focus of this statute.” 144 But, as the Court observed, there are
many ways to infringe a patent, which is where § 271(f)(2) comes in
as the basis for the infringement in the case. 145 According to the
Court:
Section 271(f)(2) focuses on domestic conduct. It provides
that a company “shall be liable as an infringer” if it
“supplies” certain components of a patented invention “in or
from the United States” with the intent that they “will be
combined outside of the United States in a manner that
would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States.” The conduct that §271(f)(2)
regulates—i.e., its focus—is the domestic act of “suppl[ying]
in or from the United States.”146
This was so, even though “lost-profits damages occurred
extraterritorially, and foreign conduct subsequent to [respondent’s]
infringement was necessary to give rise to the injury.” 147 Yet
nowhere in the case is an analysis of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, not to mention the possibility—so salient in
Morrison—that other countries may have patent laws that differ
from our own.
Seeing through the “focus” test’s localization façade, Justice
Gorsuch dissented. In his words, “[p]ermitting damages of this sort
would effectively allow U.S. patent owners to use American courts
to extend their monopolies to foreign markets. That, in turn, would
invite other countries to use their own patent laws and courts to
assert control over our economy.” 148 To be sure, “principles of
comity counsel against an interpretation of our patent laws that
would interfere so dramatically with the rights of other nations to
regulate their own economies.” 149 In sum—and without any
extraterritoriality analysis whatsoever— “the Court ends up assuming
that patent damages run (literally) to the ends of the earth. It allows
U.S. patent owners to extend their patent monopolies far beyond

144
145
146
147
148
149

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2137-38.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2143.
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anything Congress has authorized and shields them from foreign
competition U.S. patents were never meant to reach.”150
Finally, if the “focus” test is a species of localization rule, it
differs from the First Restatement’s localization rules in one crucial
respect. Unlike the First Restatement, it does not purport to be part
of a system. Recall that Beale had in mind a world where states had
agreed upon the localization rules such that if a tortious injury
occurred in State A but the negligence occurred in State B, State B
would have accepted application of the lex loci delicti as part of its
conflict of laws methodology. This a priori consent is nowhere to be
found in Morrison’s framework, which blatantly countenances the
unilateral projection of U.S. law abroad by courts through the
resurrection of an anachronistic conflict of laws fiction.
ii. Currie’s Ghost
Next, federal courts employing Morrison’s “focus” test have
precisely followed Currie’s forum-centric methodology of applying
forum law if the forum has any interest—even if it is the lesser one—
as determined by ordinary means of statutory construction.151 Thus,
in United States v. McLellan,152 the court construed the federal wire
fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, to conclude that “the structure,
elements, and purpose of the wire fraud statute indicate that its
focus is not the fraud itself but the abuse of the instrumentality in
furtherance of a fraud.”153 Moreover, “it does not matter if the bulk
of the scheme to defraud involves foreign activity[ ] [b]ecause the
focus of the wire fraud statute is misuse of U.S. wires to further a
fraudulent scheme.”154
Id. at 2143-44.
See CURRIE, supra note 14, at 178.
152
United States v. McLellan, 959 F.3d 442 (1st Cir. 2020).
153 Id. at 469.
154 Id. at 470 (internal citation omitted); see United States v. Elbaz, 332 F. Supp.
3d 960, 974 (D. Md. 2018); see also United States v. Wolfenbarger, No. 16-CR-00519LHK-1, 2020 WL 2614958, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2020)
(holding that U.S. law applies to the solicitation of child pornography in the
Philippines because the minors were enticed to engage in the activity in California.
The focus of the statute was domestic adult conduct—namely, the act of enticement.
Thus, because the defendant enticed the minors in California, U.S. law applied even
though a substantial amount of the illegal conduct happened in the Philippines);
United States v. Kalichenko, 840 F. App’x 644 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that U.S. law
150

151
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As to true conflicts of law, it is irresistible not to marshal the
famed pre-Morrison case, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California.155
In brief, a group of London reinsurers conspired to adversely affect
the U.S. insurance market.156 The Court observed that—as a result of
ordinary methods of statutory construction—”the Sherman Act
applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect in the United States.”157 To be sure,
“[s]uch is the conduct alleged here: that the London reinsurers
engaged in unlawful conspiracies to affect the market for insurance
in the United States and that their conduct in fact produced
substantial effect.” 158 In short, the “substantial effect” was the
domestic trigger for the unilateral projection of U.S. law abroad.
Currie would have been proud.
This drew a scathing dissent from none other than Justice Scalia,
who felt constrained by precedent to take an entirely opposite
approach to the one he would fashion in Morrison. For as the
majority itself conceded, “applying the Act to [the London
reinsurers’] conduct would conflict significantly with British law,
and the British Government, appearing before us as amicus curiae,
concurs,” 159 creating a true conflict of laws within Currie’s
methodology. Or, as Justice Scalia elaborated:
applied to the defendant, a Ukranian citizen, who created child pornography in the
Ukraine and sold it to a U.S. citizen; the focus of the statute was the domestic market
for illicit material, thus, due to the receipt of compensation from a U.S. citizen, U.S.
law applied even though most of the illegal activity happened in the Ukraine).
155
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). Hartford Fire is best
understood as a Charming Betsy case since the presumption had already been
overcome by precedent as to antitrust law. Id. at 814-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, limited true conflicts of law under
international law to situations where it is impossible to comply with two states’
laws at once. Id. at 799. This is clearly wrong as a matter of conflict of laws, and
indeed describes a whole other phenomenon altogether. See Anthony J. Colangelo,
Absolute Conflicts of Law, 91 IND. L.J. 719, 727-729 (2016). An interesting thought
experiment is what if Hartford Fire had been decided under Morrison’s framework
and the Court found protection of consumers to be the “focus” of the Sherman Act,
rendering it a domestic application of U.S. law? At least in Hartford Fire there was a
presumption against extraterritoriality to overcome, while under Morrison’s
“focus” fiction the presumption would have been completely—and, given
Morrison’s desire to strengthen the presumption, perversely—absent.
156 Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 776.
157 Id. at 796.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 798. Amicus briefs are one powerful way for other nations to show
displeasure with the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. In F. Hoffmann-La Roche
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The activity relevant to the counts at issue here took place
primarily in the United Kingdom, and the defendants in
these counts are British corporations and British subjects
having their principal place of business or residence outside
the United States. Great Britain has established a
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the London
reinsurance markets, and clearly has a heavy “interest in
regulating the activity.”160
At this point, we can preview—or one might even say transition
to—the final Part of this Article. Because the presumption against
extraterritoriality had already been overcome by precedent as to
antitrust law, Scalia began with another canon of statutory
construction: the Charming Besty canon, which holds that “[a]n act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations

Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 167 (2004), the majority itself noted, referencing
the London reinsurance companies’ argument:
[E]ven where nations agree about primary conduct, say, price fixing, they
disagree dramatically about appropriate remedies. The application, for
example, of American private treble-damages remedies to anticompetitive
conduct taking place abroad has generated considerable controversy. See,
e.g., 2 ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 12081209 (5th ed. 2002). And several foreign nations have filed briefs here
arguing that to apply our remedies would unjustifiably permit their
citizens to bypass their own less generous remedial schemes, thereby
upsetting a balance of competing considerations that their own domestic
antitrust laws embody. E.g., Brief for Government of Federal Republic of
Germany et al. as Amici Curiae 2 (setting forth German interest “in seeing
that German companies are not subject to the extraterritorial reach of the
United States’ antitrust laws by private foreign plaintiffs–whose injuries
were sustained in transactions entirely outside United States commerce–
seeking treble damages in private lawsuits against German companies”);
Brief for Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae 14 (“treble damages
remedy would supersede” Canada’s “national policy decision”); Brief for
Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae 10 (finding “particularly
troublesome” the potential “interfere[nce] with Japanese governmental
regulation of the Japanese market”).
These briefs add that a decision permitting independently injured
foreign plaintiffs to pursue private treble-damages remedies would
undermine foreign nations’ own antitrust enforcement policies by
diminishing foreign firms’ incentive to cooperate with antitrust authorities
in return for prosecutorial amnesty. Brief for Government of Federal
Republic of Germany et al. as Amici Curiae 28-30; Brief for Government of
Canada as Amicus Curiae 11-14.
160

Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509, U.S. at 819.
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if any other possible construction remains.”161 This canon predates
the presumption of extraterritoriality; to be sure, “the presumption
against extraterritoriality is essentially an out-growth of Charming
Betsy.” 162 Both were concerned with jurisdictional incursions into
the territorial sovereignty of other states sparking international
discord, which made perfect sense since international law at the time
of the canon’s birth was strictly territorial.163 But while international
law grew to authorize and even require extraterritoriality in some
situations,164 the presumption remained frozen in time. Which is not
to say Charming Betsy gives free reign to courts to extend U.S. law
abroad anytime there is a U.S. interest; rather, it is cabined by
“prevalent doctrines of international law.”165 Or, to use another phrase,
“international comity.”166 Citing Justice Story, Scalia explained:
The “comity” [at issue] is not the comity of courts, whereby
judges decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more
appropriately adjudged elsewhere, but rather what might be
termed “prescriptive comity”: the respect sovereign nations
afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws. That
comity is exercised by legislatures when they enact laws, and
courts assume it has been exercised when they come to
interpreting the scope of laws their legislatures have enacted.
It is a traditional component of choice-of-law theory.167
Whether one views international law and international comity
as the same or separate doctrines168 is immaterial for our purposes,
for both contain a reasonableness requirement.169 And applying that
requirement using the criteria of the Third Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law, Scalia clearly got it right.
It will be worth a somewhat lengthy block quote from his
analysis, because I want to tie it to the Second Restatement of
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
Colangelo, supra note 24, at 1060.
163 See SYMEONIDES & PERDUE, supra note 2, at 53; Colangelo, supra note 24.
164
Colangelo, supra note 24, at 1078.
165 Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 816 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
166 Id. at 817.
167 Id. (emphasis added).
168 See Childress III, supra note 31, at 22; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 405 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2018).
169 Id.
161

162
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Conflict of Laws; for—remarkably—the Third Restatement of
Foreign Relation Law’s reasonableness factors “adopt the factors
listed in § 6 of the Restatement, Second, of Conflict of Laws”:
The “reasonableness” inquiry turns on a number of factors
including, but not limited to: “the extent to which the activity
takes place within the territory [of the regulating state],” id.,
§ 403(2)(a); “the connections, such as nationality, residence,
or economic activity, between the regulating state and the
person principally responsible for the activity to be
regulated,” id., § 403(2)(b); “the character of the activity to be
regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating
state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is
generally accepted,” id., § 403(2)(c); “the extent to which
another state may have an interest in regulating the activity,”
id., § 403(2)(g); and “the likelihood of conflict with regulation
by another state,” id., § 403(2)(h). Rarely would these factors
point more clearly against application of United States law.
The activity relevant to the counts at issue here took place
primarily in the United Kingdom, and the defendants in
these counts are British corporations and British subjects
having their principal place of business or residence outside
the United States. Great Britain has established a
comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the London
reinsurance markets, and clearly has a heavy “interest in
regulating the activity.” . . . . Considering these factors, I
think it unimaginable that an assertion of legislative
jurisdiction by the United States would be considered
reasonable, and therefore it is inappropriate to assume, in the
absence of statutory indication to the contrary, that Congress
has made such an assertion.170
Section 6 is the “cornerstone” 171 of the Second Restatement’s
choice-of-law methodology172 and lists a number of similar factors
courts should consider in resolving choice-of-law disputes. They
are:

170
171
172

Hartford Fire Ins. Co, 509 U.S. at 818–19.
SYMEONIDES & PERDUE, supra note 2, at 176.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (AM. L. INST. 1971).
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(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b)
the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of
other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the
protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty,
predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied.173
According to the comments section, “[p]robably the most
important function of choice-of-law rules is to make the interstate
and international systems work well. Choice-of-law rules, among
other things, should seek to further harmonious relations between
states and to facilitate commercial intercourse between them.” 174
And:
Rules of choice of law formulated with regard for such needs
and policies are likely to commend themselves to other states
and to be adopted by these states. Adoption of the same
choice-of-law rules by many states will further the needs of
the interstate and international systems and likewise the
values of certainty, predictability and uniformity of result.175
CONCLUSION: NORMATIVE SUPERIORITY
The multilateral approaches just laid out in the previous Part are
superior to the other choice of law and attendant presumption
against extraterritoriality approaches described throughout this
Article. Unlike the First Restatement and the “focus” test, they do
not rely on formalist fictions that, in reality, sideline the interests of
other states and destroy parties’ primary predictability about what
law will apply to them at the time they act—a crucial element to the
rule of law. The First Restatement is riddled with randomly applied
“escape devices” to arrive at a law different from the one prescribed
by the Restatement, and the “focus” test requires parties to guess at
a U.S. law’s “focus” ahead of time—something even U.S. courts
struggle with. Next, unlike Currie’s forum favoritism and the
173
174
175

Id.
Id. § 6 cmt. d.
Id.
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attendant “focus” test, the multilateral approaches take into
consideration other states’ interests, avoiding anarchy and
retaliation. Moreover, by applying forum law on what may be only
minor interests compared with those of other states, these tests also
destroy parties’ primary predictability about what law will apply to
them at the time they act since at least one of them will have no
control over where suit will be brought (and thus which lex fori will
apply). By contrast, the multilateral approaches allow parties to
consult precedent and rely on stare decisis to predict what law will
apply to their multijurisdictional activity. Besides shoring up the
rule of law, such an approach encourages activity generally
considered beneficent to the domestic and international systems like
international commerce, travel, and communication because
multistate actors will be able to predict with more certainty the law
that will apply to their activities.
Finally, the Supreme Court may be moving in this direction,
even if somewhat unconsciously. In its most recent
extraterritoriality case, Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe,176 foreign plaintiffs
sued U.S. corporations for aiding and abetting child slavery abroad
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),177 which allows aliens to sue for
torts in violation of the law of nations. 178 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum, 179 the Court had already held that the ATS did not
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. 180 Thus
respondents argued that domestic conduct—namely, “operational
decisions” to aid and abet the child slavery—authorized application
of the ATS.181 The Court disagreed, observing that “[t]o plead facts
sufficient to support a domestic application of the ATS, plaintiffs
must allege more domestic conduct than general corporate
activity.”182 As William Dodge has observed, this domestic conduct
requirement appears both new and to supplement the “focus”

Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe 141 S. Ct. 1931 (2021).
Id. at 1931-32.
178 See generally Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (granting federal
courts jurisdiction for “a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States”).
179
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013).
180 Id. at 125.
181 Nestlé USA, Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 1935.
182 Id. at 1937.
176
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test.183 Thus, in at least one area, the law of extraterritoriality would
require more substantial connections with the United States for U.S.
law to apply.
Now, this would leave the author in the rather uncomfortable
position of letting serious international law offenses like child
slavery go unremedied in U.S. courts. But upon closer inspection,
that is not the case at all. Indeed, quite the opposite. All we have to
do is return to the piracy example.184 Like piracy, child slavery is a
universal jurisdiction offense under the law of nations or
international law185 that all states have an interest in, and perhaps an
obligation to, assert jurisdiction over.186 To be sure, there would not
be—indeed, there could not be—a conflict of laws because states
would be applying the same law through their municipal laws:
international law, with the obvious caveat that the municipal law
definition matches the international law definition of the offense.
But that is the subject of another article.187

183 See William S. Dodge, The Surprisingly Broad Implications of Nestlé USA, Inc.
v. Doe for Human Rights Litigation and Extraterritoriality, JUST SEC. (June 18, 2021),
https://www.justsecurity.org/77012/the-surprisingly-broad-implications-ofnestle-usa-inc-v-doe-for-human-rights-litigation-andextraterritoriality/[https://perma.cc/LGM8-X6JE] (“[T]he Restatement (Fourth) of
Foreign Relations Law rejected a separate requirement of conduct in the United
States when the focus of the statutory provision is on something other than
conduct . . . providing simply: ‘If whatever is the focus of the provision occurred in
the United States, then application of the provision is considered domestic and is
permitted’ (§ 404 cmt. c).”).
184 See supra Section III.a.
185 See Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour art. 3(a), June 17, 1999, 2133
U.N.T.S. 161.
186
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 301(3) (AM. L. INST.
2018) (“Treaties create international legal obligations for the United States . . . .”).
187
Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal Jurisdiction as an International “False
Conflict” of Laws, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 881 (2009); Anthony J. Colangelo, International
Law in U.S. State Courts: Extraterritoriality and ‘False Conflicts’ of Law, 108. AMER.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 436 (2014).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/2

